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This is another area in which the new measure falls flat. Employees of Congressmen and Senators will be responsible for making sure that their bosses file their reports on time, disclose all that the law requires, and, if there are violations, investigate them and recommend prosecution to the Attorney General.

A strong bipartisan Federal Elections Commission should be appointed to handle receipt and publication of reports and be given injunctive powers so that it could file suits against violators. Penalties should include loss of office if a winner is implicated.

#### ADVANTAGES OF INCUMBENCY

The new measure does nothing to restrict the unlimited free mailing privileges of elected federal officials, to curb effectively the use of large staffs for campaign purposes or to restrict use of the sophisticated, government-operated radio and television facilities.

A genuine reform would permit two or more free mailings for challengers, access to Capitol Hill TV and radio facilities and effective curbs on the use of paid Congressional staffs for campaign purposes.

#### LIMITS ON WHAT CANDIDATES CAN SPEND FOR THEIR OWN CAMPAIGNS.

Ceilings are imposed, depending on the federal office sought.

A solid reform would make it impossible for a clever politician to have relatives or friends funnel their own money into the campaign.

#### PROLIFERATION OF COMMITTEES

Does nothing to limit the multiplicity of campaign committees.

Only one campaign committee should be allowed and the doctrine of "agency"—widely used in other nations—should be adopted. This concept makes one treasurer legally responsible for receiving all gifts and disbursing all funds. He, as well as the candidate, can be held accountable for violations.

## CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S LOYAL TOOL

### VICTOR MARCHETTI

*Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length, critical analysis of the CIA.*

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration

and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the

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espionage against The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

After the Bay of Pigs debacle a year later, the CIA did feel the sting of Presidential disfavor for the first time, but the agency had its wrist slapped by President Kennedy because it failed in Cuba, not because it was scheming to overthrow Castro. Other than a few personnel changes at the top of the agency, and the creation of a special secret committee, which tied the CIA still closer to the administration, the agency made no changes in policies or practices. Throughout the Kennedy years, the CIA ran clandestine operations against Cuba with Presidential approval. At the same time, and at the request of the White House, the agency deeply involved itself in attempts to prop up tottering regimes in Laos and South Vietnam.

When the National Student Association scandal rocked the CIA in 1967, setting off a series of disclosures that exposed the agency's hold on a large number of youth, labor and cultural organizations, as well as many of its funding conduits, neither the executive nor the Congress tried to restrict the agency's activities. (A year earlier, Senator Fulbright's attempt to increase Congressional control over the CIA had been soundly defeated.) The CIA was simply told by President Johnson to clean up the mess and get on with its business. The ad hoc committee he had formed to look into the scandal consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Secretary of HEW, and the director of the CIA. Some covert projects were canceled, either because they had been exposed or because they were no longer thought worth the risk of exposure, but most were continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a \$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions.

last month, William Colby, former CIA station chief in Vietnam, later designer of the agency's Laotian war, and afterwards Ambassador to Vietnam in charge of pacification, was advanced to the agency's number three post of executive director. None of these adjustments suggests that the CIA plans to reduce its covert action program.

The notion that the CIA is primarily an espionage organization, preoccupied largely with technical and analytical matters, is a delusion fostered by the agency's leadership to deflect attention from the more questionable clandestine activities. CIA Director Richard Helms, in his only public speech a year ago before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, emphasized that the production and dissemination of intelligence were the basic roles of the agency, and asked his audience "to take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men." He said that intelligence collection was in 1971 "the best ever," but could not elaborate because "the enemy" might as a result identify our agents. He did, however, feel that he could mention the Penkovsky case, recalling how the Soviet colonel and other "well placed and courageous Russians" aided the CIA in unmasking Khrushchev's gamble to install strategic missiles in Cuba in 1962. Helms also noted that the National Security Act of 1947 was clear and precise regarding the CIA's legal functions, particularly in the matter of domestic security, and that four committees of Congress kept tabs on his agency. The director did not, of course, refer to the agency's paramilitary or other covert action programs.

The picture he gave newspaper editors was in keeping with the image of the CIA that Helms has assiduously cultivated ever since he was promoted from head of the agency's clandestine services to the directorship. He has said much the same thing in his many confidential sessions with the press at lunches in the private dining room of the old Occidental Restaurant on Pennsylvania Avenue, and at working breakfasts and dinners in the executive dining room of CIA headquarters at Langley, Va., where the agency's intelligence analysts—the academic and emotional opposites of the clandestine operatives—are always presented front and center, putting the agency's best and cleanest foot forward. The campaign to tame the press has been successful, if one may judge from the gentle and respectful way in which the CIA is treated by the media, especially by *The New York Times* and *Newsweek*, both of which last year printed extensive and not very penetrating articles on the CIA. Unfortunately, the image does not fit the facts. Director Helms is not presiding over the transformation of the CIA from a clandestine operational agency into merely another federal bureaucracy.

The collection of foreign intelligence by the U.S. intelligence community is at its peak today, but CIA agents have little to do with it. Almost all of the good information picked up about Russia and China comes from technical operations, most of which are controlled by the Pentagon. The CIA's espionage program against China has been a complete failure. Against the Soviet Union, the agency has fared slightly better, but only slightly, because of occasional defectors, almost all of whom have been useful to counterespionage, but not to espionage itself.

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secret contributions dur-



ing the Cuban missile crisis, this is pure hokum. Penkovsky was not a CIA agent; he spied for the British. When in the late 1950s the Soviet colonel offered his services to the United States in Ankara, the CIA turned him away, fearing that he was a provocateur for the KGB. British intelligence, however, made a note of the overture and recruited Penkovsky in Moscow a couple of years later. The CIA had to buy its share of Penkovsky with prints from the then new photographic satellites. The Soviet military build-up in Cuba was discovered by the CIA's own analysts, with no help from Penkovsky or any other Soviet agent; and the final unmasking of the scheme was also accomplished without "well placed and courageous Russians." There were none to help.

According to the National Security Act of 1947, the primary mission of the CIA is to coordinate and disseminate intelligence for the benefit of the whole government. That was what Harry Truman believed, but it never came to pass. To begin with, the temptation (and the wherewithal) to meddle in affairs of other nations was too strong to resist in the cold-war years. The CIA, controlled by such operationally oriented types as Allen Dulles, immediately involved itself in the impossible dream of an American imperium, and neither the agency nor the government has ever recovered from this obsession. The record (Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam) is proof of that statement, but so more specifically is the CIA's secret charter, that body of highly classified Presidential directives which has assigned the agency to tasks of covert political action the world over.

Well aware of the truth, the administration occupies the White House, Director Helms

spends little time wrestling with the intricacies of intelligence analysis. The weekly meetings of the U.S. Intelligence Board, the top deliberative body of the intelligence community for reviewing reports and forming national estimates, are frequently conducted by the master spy in less than twenty minutes. The subtleties and pressures of deciding the precise status of Soviet strategic strike capabilities, or the possible level of Vietcong resistance to a proposed U.S. action, are outside his concern. Helms and the CIA earn their keep not by collecting and analyzing secret information for the benefit of policy makers and planners but rather by carrying out paramilitary, political, propagandistic and other covert operations to advance U.S. foreign policy.

Congressional control of the activities of the CIA is quickly described: there is none! The four relevant committees of Congress did not meet once last year to review the agency's activities. Rump sessions of the House and Senate did glance last November at the CIA's budget request, but when the question of oversight was raised by Senators Symington and Fulbright (both members of the joint committee on the CIA) Senator Ellender, who approved the budget, said that he had "not inquired" about the CIA's activities in Laos, and Senator Stennis, in support of his colleague, advised that you have to "shut your eyes some and take what is coming" when you have an intelligence agency like the CIA. Thus spake the watchdogs.

A glance at the organization and budget of the CIA readily discloses its primary mission. Of its almost 18,000 career personnel (not including contract agents and employees of agency-owned companies), two-thirds are engaged in nonintelligence operations (largely nonespionage) operations. Of the annual budget of almost \$700 million

ations in Laos and Vietnam, or certain technical collection programs which are paid for by the Pentagon), again about two-thirds is devoted to clandestine activities, mostly covert action operations. The production of intelligence, the CIA's overt primary mission, absorbs about 10 per cent of its funds and people. The remaining 25 per cent of the money and personnel are absorbed by technical operations, general support and overhead.

Only when one understands that, despite claims to the contrary, the CIA is basically concerned with interfering

ries out this mission with the approval and at the request of the country's political leaders, can one begin to deal with the issue. It is not a matter of reforming the CIA. The need is to reform those who govern us, to convince them that they must act more openly and honestly, both with the people whom they represent and with the other nations of the world. As its name states, the CIA is only an agency; but secrecy, like power, tends to corrupt, and it will not be easy to persuade those who rule in the United States to change their ways. □

## PRISON PSYCHIATRY

# THE CLOCKWORK CURE

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The doctor straps the straitjacketed patient into a chair, injects the drug Prolixin, and tightens the eyelid clamps so that the patient cannot avoid watching the screen. The film begins. Each time an act of sex or violence is observed, the patient becomes progressively more nauseated. After enough of these treatments, he is "cured" of his aggressive impulses.

Aversion therapy, such as that paraphrased above from Stanley Kubrick's supposedly futurist film, *A Clockwork Orange*, is employed frequently in prisons and hospitals around the world. Armed with a battery of new behavioral drugs and techniques, doctors can go even further in "adjusting" antisocial personalities to behavioral norms. The new technology is upon us well in advance of 1984; the ethical problems associated with it are only beginning to demand attention.

A new prison facility in California provides a good example of the technological-moral conflict. It is called the Medical-Psychiatric Diagnostic Unit (MPDU) and is part of the Department of Correction's Medical Facility at Vacaville. It has eighty-four beds, and is designed to handle eventually all 600 to 700 inmates from the various prison Adjustment Centers (maximum-security wings) around the state. According to the Department of Corrections, the new facility will be used to diagnose and treat inmates with problems and then, it is hoped, return them as better individuals to the prison mainline, perhaps ultimately to the outside world. That sounds benevolent, but inmates and their supporters view the MPDU as a laboratory of behavioral "torture," which in practice will be performed primarily upon militant black and Chicano organizers in the prison population.

There is room for either interpretation, depending upon one's assumptions. If you believe that the primary function of penal administration is to control the present hair-trigger

prison situation is good. In addition, you may think it obviously humane to help violence-prone inmates adjust to a system that may eventually parole them and accept them on the outside. However, many inmates believe that the prison system—perhaps by design, certainly in practice—denies them the essential prerogatives of consideration as human beings, and they are accordingly alarmed by any medical-psychiatric facility aimed at curing them of "problems" the prison doctors think they detect in failures to adjust to a basically inhumane system.

Which interpretation is nearer the truth? What follows is a history of the MPDU controversy at Vacaville (Cowntown).

On November 19, 1971, the California Department of Corrections (DOC) invited a group of psychologists, psychiatrists, researchers and prison officials to meet at the University of California (Davis) to discuss prison violence and a possible new psychiatric unit at Vacaville. At the meeting, DOC officials were entirely vague as to what kind of treatment they envisioned at the proposed new facility. Pointed questions about electroshock therapy, aversion techniques and the like were evaded; several DOC officials even hastily disappeared when the questioning became too direct. What the invited participants didn't know was that, a week before standing host to the meeting at Davis, the DOC had submitted a detailed proposal for the Vacaville facility. "Looking back on it now," said one of the participants, "it is clear that we professionals were brought in to, as it were, 'legitimize' a decision that had already been made."

One of those present was Dr. Edward Opton, senior research psychologist at the Wright Institute, Berkeley. He pressed prison officials to deal with the ethical questions associated with a new psychiatric facility for prisoners—issues such as the voluntary nature of treatment, the use of aversion therapy drugs, electroshock, and so on—but was told by the DOC's research director, Dr. Lawrence Bennett, that "those who wish to discuss so-called moral and ethical questions should leave."

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